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 Professional sports are a critical and universally loved part of America’s ethos. Millions 
of fans from across the country flock every year to sports stadiums, hoping to see their favorite 
player in action or just to enjoy the ambiance of the ballgame. Every Sunday during fall and 
winter, 60,000 fans attend prodigious NFL complexes, whereas 20,000 or so fans frequent an 
MLB stadium for 162-game schedule. When fans visit these stadiums, they often will pay for a 
soda, a hot dog and maybe even a jersey. But there is another, more surreptitious payment they 
make, unbeknownst to almost everyone who attends: the actual stadium itself. Once an entirely 
private undertaking, public funding for stadiums has increased substantially since the 1950’s. In 
recent years, public subsidization has grown so much that taxpayers have contributed nearly $1 
billion to several stadiums (Farren & Philpot, 2019; Bagli, 2018).  
 Public funding for sports stadiums has correlated with the increase of sports teams’ 
valuations, granting team owners significant negotiation leverage with politicians. Many owners 
express their need for a new stadium using public dollars, citing their outdated facility, a poor 
location or to catalyze economic development for their host city. If cities refuse to shell over 
taxpayer dollars, teams have threatened to leave their home and relocate to an area which would 
be willing to accommodate them financially. Some teams, such as the Oakland Raiders, have left 
a fanbase of passionate fans behind in order to obtain a new stadium. When teams were worth 
only a few million dollars 50 years ago, governments had little incentive to ensure the team 
remained in their jurisdiction; however, now that these assets are worth billions of dollars, 
politicians either feel pressure or sense opportunity to maintain or lure a team to their city.  
Losing a sports team is certainly a huge blow to cities and fans alike, but a large amount of 
economic literature suggests that building a new stadium for the sake of recruiting a team is a 
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poor economic investment. This literature has existed for decades, and yet politicians continue to 
allocate public funding for stadiums, either to entice teams to relocate or to prevent their team 
from leaving.  
 This thesis analyzes the economic and political implications of stadium construction, and 
the many moving parts of the problem. The thesis dives deep into two case studies of recent 
stadium constructions in Las Vegas and New York, looking at the considerations of each stadium 
and how decision makers were able to build these stadiums. From overreported economic 
benefits to neighborhood revitalization, the promises made by stadium proponents simply never 
live up to the lofty expectations set. In the thesis, I explain how these processes continually play 
out, embarking on an extensive literature review of the many contributory aspects of stadium 
construction. I then explain the theoretical framework of the issue, using economic analyses such 
as the contingent valuation method (CVM) and the political theory of authors like James Q. 
Wilson to uncover the issue. There are various political and economic concepts that make up the 
dynamics of stadium construction, so this section also creates a baseline as I transition into two 
case studies.   
The Yankees and Raiders case studies serve to take this theoretical discussion and 
manifest it in a practical way, explaining how these processes play out. I choose the Yankees and 
Raiders cases studies for two reasons. The first is that both are relatively new projects that have 
limited analyses, so these case studies help update the current literature of stadium construction. 
The second is that these case studies, while two of the most expensive in history, are quite 
representative of general themes in this literature. The Raiders case study lays out the general 
processes of stadium construction, serving as a template for the ensuing Yankees case study. The 
Yankees case study also discusses general themes but delves deeper into how politicians 
 5 
negotiate with owners to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes. My analyses help to uncover the 
political and economic processes that take place in the Yankees and Raiders studies, and to take 
these analyses to uncover the larger picture of stadium construction. After, I delve into a 
discussion, which summarizes the commonalities of stadium construction domestically and 
internationally and extends the discussion to other areas of interest.  
 Public funding for stadium construction is a widely researched topic, but this thesis 
serves to branch out from existing literature by integrating a political science perspective to a 
problem typically defined as economic. Team owners may be outspoken about their new 
stadiums or fans may learn about the plans on Twitter, but political maneuverings are a seldom 
discussed aspect of the equation. It is difficult to rationalize why politicians would continue to 
fund stadiums when many are aware that doing so directly harms their constituents, but my thesis 
illustrates that there are clear reasons why politicians do so. Looking at this problem from a 
strictly economic lens cannot fully explain the issue, as publicly funded stadium construction 
continues despite overwhelming evidence of the economic detriments. At the core of this issue is 
a complex political calculus, with politicians, interest groups and owners all working together to 
create a brand-new stadium. And while these parties collaborate to construct the stadium, one 















 This chapter examines three distinct strands of the vast literature review on stadium 
construction. The first section includes a general overview of the processes and costs stadium 
construction itself. The second section covers the tangible benefits promised by stadium 
proponents, and how these promises often do not come to fruition. The third section discusses 
the intangible benefits of stadium construction and examines the extent to which these benefits 
justify the large public subsidies allocated to sports teams.  
 
Part 1: General Overview of Stadium Construction:  
 
Public funding for stadiums is an issue of public policy interest. Professional sports 
leagues are private enterprises that answer to small groups of affluent owners. Teams yield 
sizeable monopoly power over their home cities, permitting them to extract millions of taxpayer 
dollars in local subsidies through tax-exempt municipal bonds (Drukker et al., 2020). Despite 
substantial evidence to the contrary, subsidy proponents continue to claim that professional 
sports increase local income, wages, employment, and tax revenues (Rosentraub, 2014). Major 
sports leagues are highly profitable – the average National Basketball Association (NBA) team 
has an average valuation of $2.12 billion and the average Major League Baseball (MLB) 
franchise is worth $1.85 billion – but most of the profit is not reinvested in local economies or 
communities. In fact, local and state politicians often raise taxes to lure or maintain teams in their 
district, as constituents are often not aware of the lack of economic benefits and have taken little 
action on the issue (Delaney & Eckstein, 2003).  
As the four major sports leagues in the United States – the NBA, NHL, MLB and NFL – 
are all structurally monopolistic, team owners gain leverage over city and state governments 
(Safir, 1997). Sports leagues have roughly 30 teams, with expansion strictly limited so teams do 
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not compete over media markets. The fixed supply of sports teams – cities can only gain a team 
if another were to lose one – creates a dynamic in which owners have significant leeway to 
relocate if they receive a tempting offer (Safir, 1997). Baseball operates under an exemption to 
the Sherman Act and maintains geographic stability by requiring unanimous approval of team 
owners before a team can move; however, the other leagues have full jurisdiction on where they 
would like to house their franchise (Keating, 1997). The perpetual threat of relocation often 
forces city and local governments to overpay to keep their team, with funding coming from the 
taxpayer rather than the team itself (Humphreys, 2018).  
The leverage gained by sports owners due to excess demand for sports teams allows 
opportunities for owners to extract revenues. Not all sports franchises take advantage of taxpayer 
funding; for example, the Charlotte Panthers and San Francisco Giants have built new stadiums 
with modest public costs of site acquisition and infrastructural investments (Zimbalist & Noll, 
1997). Some stadiums, such as the new $5 billion SoFi Stadium for the Los Angeles Rams and 
Chargers, was entirely privately funded by ownership and a $200 million G4 loan from the NFL 
(Fenno & Farmer, 2020). But in most cases, local and state governments have paid over $100 
million in stadium subsidies, and in some cases have funded the entire expenditure. (Edelman, 
2009). If a host city refuses to build its team a new stadium, the team’s owners can make a 
credible threat to move cities, depriving the non-subsidizing city any access to premier, 
professional baseball (Quirk & Fort, 2000). Expanding into new markets would have allowed 
existing MLB owners to accrue lucrative franchise fees from new ownership groups and revenue 
sharing models, but not expanding actually proved to be more profitable (Josza & Guthrie, 
1999). Non-expansion of sports leagues allows owners to maintain a position of power, as they 
consistently resort to relocation plans unless their host city funds their expenses.  
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Through various loopholes and clever tax maneuvers by local governments, taxpayers 
heavily contribute to funding new sports stadiums. Public subsidies amounted to $177 million 
per facility while more than $6 billion in public funds were spent on stadium and arena 
construction in the 1990’s (Long, 2005; Rappaport & Wilkerson, 2001). Despite a few 
exceptions, stadiums were entirely privately financed until the early 1950’s. In 1951, MLB 
Commissioner Ford Frick announced that cities must subsidize construction of new stadiums, as 
teams were struggling to cover the costs of stadium construction while accruing a profit (Fort, 
2011). Milwaukee County Stadium was the first public-funded stadium built to attract another 
franchise, as Milwaukee representatives believed that investing in a new facility would both lure 
a professional team and bring economic development. When the Boston Braves moved to 
Milwaukee, policymakers realized that building a new facility could attract sports teams, opening 
the floodgates for cities to use public funding as a means to improve their proposal (Alakshendra, 
2016).  
After the Milwaukee precedent in the 1950s, owners convinced municipalities to provide 
public financing, arguing that a brand-new stadium would introduce economic prosperity into the 
region. To build Raymond James Stadium, the home of the Tampa Bay Buccaneers and a 
stadium paid for entirely by taxpayers, Hillsborough County imposed a half-cent sales tax 
(Corder, 1998). Governor Pawlenty of Minnesota refused to increase gas taxes to fund state 
infrastructure but raised the sales tax to fund the new Minnesota Twins stadium. Other well-
known stadiums that were entirely funded by taxpayer money include: The FedEx Forum, Time 
Warner Cable Arena and the Ford Center (Komisarchik & Fenn, 2016).  
Owners may have needed public subsidization to keep their teams afloat in 1950, but the 
rapidly increasing valuation of sports teams shows that is not the case anymore. The Cowboys 
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were bought for $8.8 million in 1973 and are now worth $5.7 billion (Gough, 2020). Adjusted 
for inflation, that figure is 18 times greater than the original investment. Affluent owners and 
sports teams understand that they do not need public funding anymore, yet they benefit from the 
monopolistic structure in place to extract huge amounts regardless.   
The search for a new stadium has also been intensified by new technology and its huge 
potential for profit. Multipurpose, ordinary stadiums that were common in the early 20th century 
gave way to elaborate, single-sport facilities (Zimbalist & Noll, 1997). These new stadiums 
feature numerous new revenue-generating opportunities, including elaborate concessions, 
catering, advertising, and even restaurants and bars that have full views of the field itself 
(Hartell, 1998). The most lucrative inventions, however, are luxury boxes. Al Davis, the former 
owner of the Oakland Raiders, moved stadiums entirely because the Los Angeles Memorial 
Coliseum refused to construct more luxury boxes. For football games, luxury box tickets can be 
worth $15,000-25,000 per game, creating huge margin for owners (Kane, 2012). Additionally, a 
new facility adds millions of dollars annually to a team’s revenues for a few years after the 
stadium opens, as well as removing the variability in team revenues associated with a dilapidated 
stadium (Rascher et al, 2012). Teams try to reduce uncertainty as much as possible, since a 
team’s actual performance varies from year to year. A new stadium introduces a layer of stability 
for owners – increased ticket prices and features such as luxury boxes are steady streams of 
revenue – so regardless of how well the team is playing, owners are reassured that they will still 
profit.  
A common vehicle for the financing of major league stadiums is the private use of tax-
exempt bonds, as these bonds expedite the construction process and are cheaper for owners 
(Goodman, 2002). Team owners want to finance the tax-exempt bonds that the city and state 
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would guarantee because the costs of construction are lower with reduced interest rates on these 
bonds. In the last three decades, tax-exempt bonds have raised $17 billion to facilitate 
construction of stadiums across the nation. According to a 2012 study, tax exemption alone on 
municipal bonds issued for sports infrastructure cost $146 million a year and taxpayers’ subsidy 
to bond holders would be about $4 billion at the maturity of all the bonds issued since 1986 
(Kuriloff & Preston, 2012). Today, the proportion of public funding to build professional sports 
stadiums is greater than private contribution (Alakshendra, 2016).  
Large local subsidies often receive the bulk of media attention, yet almost no attention is 
paid to federal subsidies implicit in every tax-exempt municipal bond dedicated to stadiums. Lost 
tax revenue from tax-exempt bonds is not part of the computation of federal spending and, 
therefore, is not included in the federal budget (Drukker et al., 2020). This arrangement reduces 
the transparency of the federal allocation of resources to these projects. Since the federal 
government has limited control of the tax subsidy, the amount of the tax expenditure is not 
decided through the annual appropriations procedure (Drukker et al., 2020). In effect, stadium 
funding is a form of entitlement spending, whose amount is mostly specified by circumstances 
outside of the federal government’s control (Congressional Budget Office, 2009). Additionally, 
because tax exemption lowers interest on debt and reduces the amount cities and teams must pay 
for stadiums, tax-exempt bonds are an inefficient form of subsidy (Zimbalist & Noll, 1997). The 
loss of federal tax revenue exceeds the reduction in the bond issuers’ interest costs; stadiums 
such as the Meadowlands in New Jersey and the Superdome in New Orleans cause an annual 
federal tax loss surpassing $1 million (Zimbalist & Noll, 1997). Taxpayers from a small 
neighborhood in rural Illinois may be funding a stadium in Boston, despite the likelihood of them 
not stepping foot in the stadium or even being aware of its existence.  
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Congressional hearings have addressed this issue for decades, but the needle has not 
moved toward change. Hearings date back to the mid 1960s, in which the 88th Congress debated 
the construction of the District of Columbia Stadium and allegations of misconduct. Thirteen 
years later, the Senate considered the Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act, in which 
members of Congress sounded off on the inequities of taxpayer subsidization of stadiums. 
Senator Arlen Specter labelled the practice “legalized extortion,” and while many Senators and 
witnesses outlined the problems with stadium financing, the bill never made it to the House of 
Representatives.  
The 2007 hearing titled “Professional Sports Stadiums: Do They Divert Public Funds 
From Critical Public Infrastructure?” addressed the troubling allocation of taxpayer funds. 
Representatives pointed out that the Minnesota Twins received public funding for their new 
stadium just a year before the I-35 West bridge collapsed, the Yankees built a new stadium worth 
over $1 billion despite 50 structural bridges in the city and several Cleveland teams received new 
stadiums while dangerous bridges remained operational. Members of Congress also pointed to 
the increasing value of sports franchises when they obtain a new stadium; the Detroit Lions and 
Tigers increased in value from $83 million to $290 million and $150 million to $839 million, 
respectively. President George W. Bush spent $600,000 to buy a small stake in the Texas 
Rangers, and after he and Rangers’ co-owners persuaded voters to fund a new stadium, he sold 
his stake for a profit of $14.9 million.  
While luxuries such as professional sports stadiums are subsidized, funding required for 
critical infrastructure needs are neglected and underfunded. Studies show that neglect, not age, is 
the root cause of most infrastructure failures in America. Deferring maintenance to spend in 
other areas is a handy expedient for public officials faced with problems in balancing their 
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budgets (Regan, 1988). Regan writes that politicians like to get credit for what they do, and the 
credit is more noteworthy when you can cut the ribbon at the opening of a new facility. 
Infrastructure improvements are essential for one’s well-being, but constituents and the media 
are not interested in bridge maintenance (Grix et al, 2017). 
Legislation aiming to curb excessive funding to stadiums has also made its way through 
Congress, but it has either missed the mark or made things worse. With the Tax Reform Act of 
1986, Congress attempted to eliminate tax exemptions for bonds by removing them from the 
category of private activity bonds exempt from federal taxation (Drukker et al., 2020). Intended 
to limit the public financing of stadiums, the Act effectively placed responsibility on state and 
local governments to finance the bulk of the stadium if they wanted to receive a federal subsidy. 
Congress thought that provisions included to increase public funding of stadiums would anger 
constituents and reduce funding to these centers, but they erred (Kunst, 2017). The estimation 
was faulty due to the combination of professional sports leagues’ monopoly power that maintains 
excess demand for franchises, as well as stadium proponents’ use of pseudo-economic studies 
showing that stadiums pay for themselves (Zimmerman, 2007). 
 
Part 2: Economic Literature on Tangible Benefits 
In various studies spanning decades and covering different sports leagues, economic 
analysis yields the same result: sports teams and their stadiums do not stimulate the economy and 
can even have a net negative effect (Zimbalist & Noll, 2000, Safir, 1997). In theory, a stadium 
can spur economic growth if sports are a significant export industry, meaning it attracts non-
residents to buy the local product. If sports teams result in the sale of certain rights to national 
firms, such as product licensing or broadcasting, stadiums would be profitable and benefit local 
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communities (Zimbalist & Noll, 2000). In reality, sports have very little effect on regional net 
exports, and rarely attracts tourists or new industries. Out of a detailed analysis of over twenty 
stadiums, Zimbalist & Noll concluded that professional sports have very little economic impact, 
with another study comparing the benefit to a mid-sized department store (Zimbalist & Noll, 
2000; Wolla, 2017).  
Studies designed to persuade cities and constituents to sponsor new stadiums grossly 
overestimate the revenue sports teams bring in and neglect the opportunity cost stadiums incur. 
Humphreys (2019) found that the concentration of economic activity in and around facilities on 
game day represents displacement of existing consumer spending. The money spent at games 
comes primarily from local residents and likely would have been spent elsewhere in the area 
absent a professional team. The majority of economic activity at stadiums takes place during a 
roughly three-hour period at select times of the year, whereas busy retail facilities or shopping 
malls are open for hours nearly every day. While the frenetic pace of a game and the sheer 
number of resources provided at a new stadium may trick consumers into thinking the stadium 
catalyzes economic progress, research demonstrates that consumers fail to understand their 
economic impact (Trumpbour, 2007). Across the major sports leagues, studies show that stadium 
proponents overstated economic benefits by 236%, primarily because the reduced spending on 
other activities that enables people to attend stadium events was not netted against stadium 
spending (Zimmerman, 1996).  
On average, a stadium generates $145 million per year, but very little of the revenue goes 
back into the community (Vegesna, 2019). Zimmerman (1996) found that a new stadium had no 
discernable impact in 27 of 30 metropolitan areas and had a negative impact in the other three. 
Coates and Humphreys (2008) found no evidence that the opening of a new stadium in the NFL, 
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NBA, NHL or MLB was associated with any increase in local income per capita over the period 
1969 to 1994. For instance, The Oakland Raiders (now the Las Vegas Raiders) and Golden State 
Warriors’ value has skyrocketed fivefold in the last few decades, but Oakland’s roads are rated 
towards the bottom of the country and the Oakland Unified School District cut 340 jobs during 
the 2019-2020 school year (Paulas, 2018). Subsidy proponents argue that teams’ increased 
valuations and their subsequent economic effect will uplift communities; the above economic 
indicators show that both teams did not help Oakland. Not only did the teams not uplift the 
community, but they jetted to new locations in 2019 because of financial incentives. Yet, in 
March 2020, Oakland Athletics President Dave Kaval stated the need for a new stadium, citing 
significant economic benefits from their games and the increase of employment that would 
follow.  
Increased employment from a new stadium is a common talking point of politicians and 
owners alike, but the cost to create stadium jobs are enormous compared with other industries. 
Maryland’s $177 million investment to create Camden Yards Stadium – the home of the 
Baltimore Orioles – netted 1,394 jobs, for an average cost of $127,000 per job (Zimmerman, 
1996). Other economic development programs in the state, such as the $32.5 million investment 
in the Sunny Day Fund, created 5,200 full-time jobs, for a total cost of $6,250 per job. 
Professional sports have a small positive effect on earning per employee in the amusement and 
recreation sector, but these gains are offset by decreases in earnings and employments in other 
sectors (Coates & Humphreys, 2003). Follow-up studies conducted by Jasina and Rotthoff 
(2008) have confirmed Coates and Humphreys’ findings, adding further evidence that 
employment does not benefit from stadium construction.  
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Other cities convince constituents and local governments that the presence of a new 
stadium and the fans it attracts will spur ancillary development near the stadium, in turn creating 
benefits outside of the stadium itself. These strategies can be seen in practice in multiple 
occasions. Worried that losing their football team would hurt local economies, Indianapolis 
taxpayers directly subsidized a $20 million renovation in 1998, $12 million in 2003 and $7.2 
million in 2006 (Trumpbour, 2006). As recently as March 2021, Augusta, Georgia project 
managers claimed they would generate more than $600 million in new spending and new sales 
tax dollars over the next 30 years (Augusta Chronicle, 2021). Promising $600 million may sound 
appealing, but deeper looks at estimations like this show that these numbers do not materialize. 
Overblown projections like this do not factor in opportunity costs taking away from other 
industries, double-count sales tax revenues and underestimate final costs of the stadium 
construction itself (deMause, 2021). 
Some cities disregard economic rationale entirely when constructing a new stadium, 
instead arguing that a team is essential to being viewed as major market. In Cincinnati, the entire 
campaign to publicly finance two new stadiums was framed around the slogan “Keep Cincinnati 
a Major League City.” Growth coalition members eschewed the idea that new stadiums would 
provide economic revitalization for Cincinnati, but rather enhance the social status of a 
competing city in Ohio (Delaney & Eckstein, 2003). An astroturf organization named Citizens 
for a Major League Future relied on large corporations and a D.C. pollster to prey on 
Cincinnatians fears that without a sports team, the social status of city would sink lower across 
the nation (Fehrman, 2011). In Minneapolis, stadium proponents argued that a new baseball 
stadium was important because it would keep the city as one of the few with teams in the major 
four sports leagues, a measurement of a first-rate city (Trumpbour, 2006). Part 3 of the literature 
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review expands on the intangible benefits raised by the Cincinnati and Minnesota campaigns to 
determine if these benefits justify public subsidization.  
 
Part 3: Economic Literature on Intangible Benefits 
The previous section argued that the tangible benefits of stadium construction do not 
materialize, but a complete analysis must also account for the potential intangible public 
benefits. Job numbers and economic benefits are proven to be overstated, but if a new stadium 
leads to vast public benefits, perhaps taxpayer contributions are justified. This consideration 
leads to several questions that this section will cover in depth. The first question is how much the 
intangible benefits of a new stadium are worth to the average citizen. The second question is to 
take the valuation assigned to these teams and determine if the public benefits outweigh the 
taxpayer contributions.  
Determining the value of the intangible benefits offered by sports stadiums is a complex 
enterprise, as there are many advantages to measure. Increased merchandise options, more 
attractive parking, better food quality or even an upgraded air conditioning system are all 
benefits of a new stadium. Additionally, sports are similar to a public good, in that sports are 
both non-rivalrous and non-excludable; all fans have the ability to watch a broadcast game, root 
for their team collectively and are not barred from viewing due to financial reasons. Sports is one 
of countless public good offerings available to citizens, with other examples ranging from 
streetlights and lighthouses to flood control systems. Deciphering how much these various goods 
are worth is difficult, considering citizens find different goods more or less useful and assigning 
tangible value to an intangible benefit is not a common practice. Most have a firm price they 
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would pay for a gallon of milk, but not for how much they would pay for their favorite sports 
team.  
Regardless of the method used to determine the valuation of a sports team or a new 
stadium, fans do not value their team as much as they are paying in subsidies. It may seem 
difficult to draw conclusions about intangible data, but the variety of existing shadow pricing 
methods in the literature have all reached this same finding. The most popular valuation methods 
in sports construction literature are the contingent valuation method (CVM) and hedonic pricing, 
as each method breaks down a large-scale issue into smaller parts to obtain a more accurate 
valuation. These methods have been used for sports stadiums across the country and in slightly 
different manners, but each study has illustrated that the tangible and intangible benefits of sports 
stadiums are outweighed by the tangible and intangible costs.  
CVM analysis of sports stadiums measures several facets of non-market goods to 
determine annual willingness to pay, including civic pride, estimations of the incremental values 
of public goods produced and even race relations. A 2001 study surveyed Pittsburgh residents to 
find a total discounted non-use value of the Pittsburgh Penguins NHL team to the host 
metropolitan statistical area of between $17.2 and $48.3 million (Johnson et al., 2001). This 
valuation is not net-zero, indicating that the public certainly values their team highly, but these 
figures are only a fraction of the total cost of the new $321 million arena the team eventually 
built in 2010. A CVM study conducted in Jacksonville a few years later measured to see if an 
NFL franchise elevated the city’s civic status and in turn increased the valuation for its citizens. 
The authors found that the present value of public goods created by the Jaguars is $36.5 million 
or less, far below subsidies provided to attract the Jaguars (Johnson et al., 2005). Economists 
have conducted CVM analyses in other areas such as Baltimore and Kentucky to survey citizens’ 
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willingness to pay for their own sports teams. In each of these studies, the aggregate valuation of 
each team was far less than the proposed stadium renovations in these areas. In other words, the 
annual willingness to pay for Jaguars fans or fans of other teams in Pittsburgh and Kentucky was 
far below the required number to justify the subsidy. Fans would have to assign a tremendous 
amount of value to this public good to warrant the high price tag of the stadiums. 
Studies using hedonic pricing reinforce the findings established by CVM studies, in that 
the many contributory benefits of stadium construction are not worth the cost. By using 
regression analysis to isolate the value of an intangible cost or benefit, hedonic market analysis 
looks for the signal among the noise of stadium construction. For stadium construction, a useful 
measurement to determine if new stadiums are worth their price is to isolate home values in areas 
with old versus new stadiums. By using repeated observations of cities over time, economists 
deduced identification of the NFL effect on home prices through franchise expansion and 
movement. The authors found that rents are approximately 8 percent higher and wages are 4 
percent lower in cities with franchises, though the latter of these two effects is not significant 
(Carlino & Coulson, 2004). A study conducted a year later reached a similar conclusion, in that 
housing prices near FedEx Stadium in Washington D.C. slightly increased housing values in the 
surrounding area (Tu, 2005). Seven years later, an additional study confirmed the preceding 
results, in that positive externalities from professional sports facilities may be capitalized into 
residential real estate prices (Feng & Humphreys, 2012). Even international studies have 
supported these findings, in that the increased home prices in Berlin are minimal in combatting 
the negative externalities of stadium construction in surrounding areas (Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 
2008).  
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The effect of NFL franchises on home values is certainly not net-zero, so owning a home 
near these areas during stadium renovations can certainly benefit homeowners. But the key part 
of the equation is measuring the assigned value of a new stadium to the public subsidy that 
accompanies said stadium. If public subsidies only register in the $10-50 million range in 
exchange for a brand-new NFL stadium, this investment would benefit homeowners greatly as 
they would see their home prices increase for a relatively cheap cost. Yet, these subsidies have 
ranged near or over $1 billion, so an 8 percent increase in home values is not justification for this 
huge price tag. The decrease in wages from the Carlino & Coulson study is also an alarming 
statistic, as it indicates that homeowner benefits are offset by wage decreases in the area. These 
effects are not statistically significant so they cannot be discussed as in-depth as home price 
increases, but these findings are certainly worrying. The last consideration added by these studies 
is that while having a stadium in the same city may be a benefit, having a stadium next door has 
occasionally shown to be harmful. Noise, trash, congestion and construction are all  
“disamenities,” in that these previously nonexistent negative externalities are created because of 
the new stadium.  
CVM and hedonic market analysis are just two of the myriad ways at analyzing the cost-
benefit analysis of stadium construction, and every method indicates that stadium construction is 
problematic. It must be stressed that stadium construction can lead to tangible benefits for many 
members of the population, such as a diehard fan. Yet, until the price tag for these projects is 
lowered to match the assigned willingness to pay or the average valuation of the team itself, 
stadium construction will continue to serve as a poor investment for American communities.  
The next question to be answered in this equation is if the tangible and intangible benefits 
have been proven to fall beneath taxpayer contributions, why politicians continue to place 
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taxpayers on the hook. Having constituents pay for something that is not beneficial seems 
counterintuitive to promises made by politicians when running for office. As my theoretical 























 CVM and hedonic pricing show that the average taxpayer always ends up with a poor 
deal, and yet new stadiums are being built at the quickest rate in recorded history. The literature 
on stadium construction’s negative effects is available for any decision maker to observe, but 
these very decision makers are all too eager to build the newest stadium. Clearly, these decisions 
are not made to stimulate local economies, but rather to achieve some form of political gain. This 
section lays out the poltical concepts involved in stadium construction, showing that politicians 
have incentive to disregard the taxpayer and seek out these projects.  
The study of stadium construction is a classic example of powerful interests exerting their 
power over less organized and influential groups. The concentrated gainer and diffuse loser 
political market comes under the heading of "client politics,” which arises when an organized 
minority or interest group benefits at the expense of the public. Client politics are omnipresent in 
the world of governance. Tax policy is a hybrid of majoritarian and client politics; the 
majoritarian aspect is that the tax burden of Americans is kept relatively low compared to other 
countries and requires everyone to pay, whereas the many loopholes allowing powerful political 
leaders or interest groups to obtain special breaks in tax bills reflect client politics. For 
appropriations, pork projects taken up by various representatives and members of Congress are 
costly and only benefit a very limited number of constituents. Proposed projects such as the 
Gravina Island Bridge, colloquially referred to as the “Bridge to Nowhere,” are reflections of 
client politics, in that a small number Alaskans pushed strongly for a $398 million project that 
would have very little use for anyone outside of their small jurisdiction. Client politics is 
apparent in regulatory policies, environmental policy and more. Any time an organized party has 
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incentive to exert their sphere of influence to achieve financial or political gain, client politics are 
surely present. 
Considering that a small coterie of interests is essential to large-scale stadium 
construction projects, this phenomenon is similar to the concept of client politics. The classic 
analysis of client politics is the seminal work The Politics of Regulation by James Q. Wilson. In 
this book, Wilson and colleagues conduct reviews of nine regulatory agencies, with the 
concluding chapter summarizing his findings of how these agencies operate. Using Wilson’s 
work as a foundation, I describe how client politics presents a useful framework for 
understanding the logic of stadium construction.  
 While subsidies can increase profits, subsidization encourages competition and new 
companies to form, in turn reducing the effect of the subsidy. Wilson describes that:  
 
All firms seek to maximize profits, and profits can be increased if competition is reduced, 
or government subsidies are obtained. Though firms will not refuse subsidies if they are 
offered, subsidies have the disadvantage of increasing profitability without necessarily 
restricting entry into the industry. The prospect of these benefits will encourage new 
companies to form, increase competition, and thus reduce each firms’ share of subsidies 
(Wilson, 1982).   
 
Wilson’s analysis is not a departure of traditional economics, as cheaper cost of entry, in this 
case through subsidization, will incentivize firms to enter the market. What makes the NFL, 
MLB and other leagues so profitable is that they receive consistent subsidies, while also 
maintaining a monopolistic structure that avoids the downfalls of traditional subsidization. 
Barriers of entry into these leagues are firm, as each major American sports league has a cap of 
roughly 30-32 teams. Receiving a $750 million subsidy, as in the case of the Las Vegas Raiders, 
will not subsequently incentivize other parties to create a team and enter the market, because this 
possibility does not exist. Many major media markets yearn for sports teams, either for financial 
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reasons or to enhance the civic pride of the city, but these leagues understand that 30-32 teams is 
their optimal economic outcome. Wilson writes that “subsidies have the disadvantage of 
increasing profitability without necessarily restricting entry into the industry,” but the inherent 
restrictions of these leagues allow huge amounts of profitability without any considerations for 
external competition. Sports teams extract as much as they can from local, state and federal 
sources, free from traditional worries that these funds will encourage entry.   
 The monopolistic structure of these leagues is inherently undemocratic, but many 
politicians allow the structure to continue due to potentially substantial advantages. Despite little 
financial incentive to pursue these projects, there is high incentivization for politicians to follow 
this path:  
 
But it is not necessary to suppose that firms provide cash payoffs to get their way. If they 
can influence – by propaganda or campaign contributions – the electoral prospects of 
politicians, then these politicians, once in office, can see to it that their bureaucratic 
subordinates, the regulatory officials, are selected and instructed so that they serve the 
interests of the regulated firms… the economic groups control a disproportionate share of 
political resources and that these resources can be used to control the behavior of 
administrative agencies. 
 
Politicians carrying out policies that are not beneficial for their constituencies is a quintessential 
aspect of client politics. Political figures understand that the influence of these teams, especially 
in the perpetual threat of relocation, have substantial implications for their political prospects. 
Allowing a team to relocate may be a responsible decision for a local or state government, but 
unaware constituents would be angered that their city lost their team. To avoid these outcomes, 
affluent “firms,” in this case sports teams with a limited number of employees but vast resources, 
receive huge benefits compared to the diffuse losses of thousands or millions of constituents. By 
sacrificing the very well-being of the constituents that they hope will reelect them in the next 
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term, politicians satisfy the regulated firms for their own political gain. These well-organized 
groups are agents for social change, so satisfying the requests of these agencies is a politically 
savvy decision. Satisfying a small, organized group may seem counterintuitive, as the vast 
majority of constituents do not stand to benefit and would realistically punish politicians for 
leaving them worse off. Yet, these individuals are too unorganized and the tax effects too small-
scale or complex for many to understand, so politicians continue to satisfy the powerful “client,” 
in this case the sports teams.  
 The behavior of politicians is a much easier proposition when the cost-benefit analysis of 
these decisions is apparent. In the same chapter, Wilson argues that: 
 
We want to understand these rewards in order to predict how [politicians] will behave as 
regulators. Moreover, the economic perspective is a powerful analytical tool; provided 
the facts are consistent with the model, it offers and elegant and parsimonious way of 
explaining a great deal of human behavior.  
 
Ideally, politicians are elected to serve a group of constituents. Driven by reelection hopes or the 
search for power, many politicians do not abide by this ideal and are, in turn, self-interested or 
career oriented. Client politics is one of many instances of governmental action that benefits the 
few instead of the many; however, understanding the rewards of this system offers the “elegant 
and parsimonious way” of explaining the thought process of these individuals. Public funding for 
stadiums has proliferated exponentially since the 1950’s, to the point where most projects are 
now publicly funded. Despite this trend harming taxpayers quite directly, there has seldom been 
public outcry over the issue. The social and political benefits of obtaining or maintaining a sports 
team far outweigh the negligible cost of public anger towards these projects, so there is little 
incentive for politicians to reject these deals. Recruiting a new team or building a spectacular, 
innovative new stadium can even be seen as an accomplishment only achieved by a responsible, 
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respectable politician. Stadium construction as a medium of client politics becomes much clearer 
when using Wilson’s idea of reward as a predictor of human behavior. As long as stadium 
construction continues to yield rewards, politicians have little incentive to remedy their 
decisions. Only when the costs outweigh the reward, whether that be through public protests or 
poorer results in elections, will these actions begin to change.  
Using Wilson’s analysis of client politics and regulation sets a strong foundation for this 
argument, but not all of stadium construction adheres to traditional client politics. The most 
notable difference between the theory of client politics and the practice of stadium construction 
is secrecy. Normally, client politics is clandestine politics, as the concentrated gainers do not 
want many people to know of their actions and will seldom issue press releases bragging of their 
tax breaks. Stadium construction differs in that the process is open and available for anyone to 
observe, with the gainers counting on the naivete of the taxpayers. Taxpayers are aware of the 
project and think it will actually benefit them. Here the machinations of the concentrated 
interests are obscured not by secrecy but by complexity.  
In The Symbolic Uses of Politics, by political scientist Murray Edelman, Edelman argues 
that naivete or political symbolism is used to placate citizens from the reality of a complex issue. 
In the book, Edelman lays out the philosophy of “symbolic politics,” which argues that 
government regulation of business is a charade that soothes consumers by supplying them with a 
pleasant myth rather than tangible benefits:  
 
The systematic research in political science of the last several decades has repeatedly 
called attention to wide gulfs of knowledge between our solemnly taught, common sense 
assumptions of what political institutions do and what they actually do… many of the 
public programs universally taught and believed to benefit a mass public in fact benefit 
relatively small groups (Edelman, 1964). 
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Stadium construction is certainly an example of Edelman’s theory, in that unaware 
citizens are often enthusiastic about the economic prospects of a new stadium due to exaggerated 
reports from their representatives. Rhetoric of job creation and economic revitalization are 
common explanations for new stadiums, but all this rhetoric accomplishes is to masquerade the 
true effects of the stadium itself. Citizen groups that see beyond the façade of stadium 
construction have been unsuccessful at convincing others that these benefits are not legitimate. 
Perhaps cognitive dissonance that one’s sports team is inherently quite valuable convinces 
citizens that a new sports stadium is worth the price tag, or maybe the new infrastructure in the 
area convinces others that the stadium is more than just a location for a sports team. Regardless 
of the rationale, politicians capitalize on the ignorance of their constituents, using charged 
language and overblown economic benefits to achieve public acquiescence. 
Client and symbolic politics help uncover why politicians, despite stated economic 
disadvantages, support the construction of new stadiums. Some politicians may be simply 
unaware of the problem and regret their support after the drawbacks come to fruition, but others 
are certainly well-aware of the harms and continue anyways to achieve political gain. In the next 
section, I present case studies of the Raiders and Yankees to further develop the idea of client 
and symbolic politics and how these theoretical concepts play out in practice. Both case studies 
not only branch out these ideas, but represent the themes, strategies and considerations that make 










Case Study #1: Leaving for Luxury - The Las Vegas Raiders 
 
 
Founded in 1960, the Raiders have been one of the most well-known sports franchises in 
American sports, mainly due to the myriad of dedicated fans and a laundry list of Hall of Fame 
talents. After Minneapolis accepted an offer to join the established National Football League as 
an expansion team, regulations required the American Football League (AFL) to search for their 
expansion team to maintain an equal number of teams per league. Oakland was an unlikely 
location to inhabit a football franchise, considering the city had not asked for a team, no Oakland 
stadium was suitable for an NFL franchise and there was already a successful Bay Area franchise 
in the San Francisco 49ers (Dickey, 1991). Yet, when Los Angeles Chargers owner Barron 
Hilton threatened to forfeit his franchise unless another West Coast city were awarded the team, 
the league rewarded Oakland with a brand-new team. Several prominent businessmen from the 
area invested in the new team, working with contractors, real estate developers and local 
politicians to sustain the franchise. The Raiders played their first snap of football on September 
11, 1960 at Kezar Stadium, a publicly owned and operated stadium in the heart of San Francisco. 
After hopping around several venues and consistently posting poor records, several leading 
partners threatened to relocate their team unless Oakland provided a new stadium (Dickey, 
1991). The city of Oakland obliged, constructing the Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum, the 
home of the Raiders as recently as two years ago.   
The Raiders’ recent departure to Las Vegas in 2019 drew great fanfare, yet this was not 
the franchise’s first exit. Prior to the 1980 season, Raiders owner Al Davis attempted to improve 
the Oakland Coliseum, aiming to install profitable luxury boxes. When Oakland declined to 
renovate, Davis signed a signed a Memorandum of Agreement to move the Raiders to Los 
Angeles. League owners met this decision with significant pushback; the move required three-
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fourths approval but was defeated 22-0 with five owners abstaining. Unperturbed, Davis 
attempted to move the team anyway, but an injunction blocked his plans of relocation.  
In response, the Raiders eventually filed an antitrust lawsuit against the NFL, and this 
case became a catalyst in allowing future teams to relocate. In Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum 
Commission v. NFL (1981), the Ninth Circuit court deliberated on the question of whether the 
NFL consists of separate entities rather than one single enterprise. The court concluded that the 
NFL’s member teams are separate business entities, therefore denying the NFL’s motion and 
permitting the Raiders to make singular decisions about their future home city (Nieto, 1981). In 
1982, the Raiders packed their bags and moved to Los Angeles, filling the gaping hole that 
existed in the country’s second-largest media market. When the Colts left Baltimore, owners of 
NFL teams voted to take no action, citing the multi-million-dollar verdict they suffered in trying 
to stop the Raiders’ move (Doherty, 2007).  
This decision may seem to punish the conglomerate of the NFL from restricting 
movement, but empirical evidence shows the biggest loser was the taxpayer. NFL team owners 
had struck a blow against the NFL’s leverage to stop relocation, as these threats had legal 
backing; local governments could no longer rely on the NFL to lend them support in preventing 
relocation. Between 2005 and 2020, legislated stadium subsidies, or public appropriations 
awarded to stadium proposals without direct approval of citizens, were applied in more than 80% 
of all professional stadium projects in North America (Kellison & Mills, 2020). Utilization of 
this system is omnipresent in the NFL to this day, and the 1982 Raiders were a key catalyst in 
this development.   
In exploring opportunities for the Raiders’ relocation, Las Vegas emerged as the leading 
candidate, due to an intriguing medley of private investors, limited competition and substantial 
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public incentives (Mayer & Cocco, 2020). In late 2016, the county and the franchise reached a 
deal to subsidize a nearly $2 billion stadium, with the public sector responsible for contributing 
40%, or $750 million. This number set the new record for public contribution, not in the NFL, 
but for any of the major sports leagues. Other sources of funding come from a $261 million Bank 
of America loan, as well as a $162.2 million loan from the NFL (Saraceno, 2017).  
Nicknamed the “Death Star” due to its intimidating appearance and reflective black 
paneling, the 1.75 million square foot Allegiant Stadium was fully operational for the first time 
in the 2020 season. The stadium has 9.85 miles of wire ropes to suspend the etfe roof, 28,000 
tons of structural steel, an amount heavier than Statue of Liberty, and 105,000 cubic yards of 
concrete for 257 miles of sidewalk, which equals the distance from Las Vegas to Los Angeles 
(Gutierrez, 2020). Current Raiders owner Mark Davis also prioritized the interconnectivity of the 
fan experience, wanting to create a stadium that would become a cultural icon. Allegiant has 
1,700 WiFi access points, 227 miles of cable, 2,200 TV screens and even a “selfie station” 
featuring the Las Vegas strip, features that no stadium has ever implemented (Barrabi, 2020).  
 
Stadium Construction Process:   
In order to fund this expensive and state-of-the-art stadium, Las Vegas representatives 
followed past precedent and relied heavily on taxpayer contributions. The answer was a .88% 
increase in the hotel tax, which consultants claimed would pay off all the municipal bonds the 
city had invested. Local and state governments would accrue additional revenue through a 
combination of municipal bonds and tourist tax increases (Mayer & Cocco, 2020). With the 
majority of funding coming from an increase in the hotel tax, lawmakers espoused that this tax 
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would primarily affect visitors and any negative economic impact would be negligible for Las 
Vegans.  
Economists agree that this rationale was not based in economic theory, but rather in 
conjecture from the Raiders’ owner and consultants charged with convincing the parties 
involved. The basis of the disagreement stems from the incidence of the hotel tax. Previous 
literature of hotel taxes shows that increased taxes lead to a decrease in both hotel occupancy and 
a decrease in the next of tax price received by hotels (Collins & Stephenson, 2017). The notion 
that hotel taxes will be paid by visitors from outside the taxing jurisdiction carries much appeal 
among state and local government leaders seeking to avoid angering local voters. However, 
empirical evidence shows that the economic distortions created by hotel taxes adversely affect 
the city instituting the tax. Since there are 147,238 hotel rooms in Las Vegas and nearly 50 
million tourists visit each year, the effect of this change is potentially highly disruptive (Hotel 
Valuation Index, 2018). Separate sports consultants and advisors not working on the project, 
such as former executive Jim Nagourney, agreed that the team’s forecast for outside fans and 
hotel taxes were exaggerated to convey public benefit (Belson, 2020).  
State leaders who voted in 2016 to sink $750 million into the stadium were also sold on 
construction jobs the project would generate. They were told, from consultants on the project and 
Raiders front office members, that the stadium would create 18,000 jobs, including 11,000 
“person-years of employment” to build the stadium itself (Gentry, 2020). Jeremy Aguero, a lead 
consultant for Applied Analysis (the firm that handled the construction of Allegiant Stadium), 
said that “the entire idea of the public's investment in Allegiant Stadium was largely to drive 
additional activity from an economic standpoint.” This was music to the ears of Nevada 
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lawmakers, considering the sheer amount of construction jobs that evaporated during the Great 
Recession.  
Despite claims from various Las Vegas stakeholders, Allegiant Stadium construction did 
not spur job growth. After completion of the stadium itself, a report from the contractor revealed 
that the project created 5,656,218 hours of construction labor (Las Vegas Stadium Authority, 
2020). That is only 2,719 full-time equivalent jobs, or approximately 900 in each of the three 
years of construction, around a quarter of the initial estimate. Former State Senator Patricia 
Farley, who voted to shuffle tax revenue to construct the stadium, remarked that she was “highly 
disappointed” in the discrepancy between the reality and the projections (Gentry, 2020). “It’s a 
forewarning to future legislators asked to consider these types of ventures,” Farley said. “There 
are no consequences when those who stand to benefit the most are knowingly not truthful when 
testifying to the Legislature.” Owners, with perpetual leverage over these processes, never meet 
their comeuppance, instead placing the burden on the taxpayer. Examples of new sports 
stadiums’ inability to create new construction jobs is well-established, but Las Vegas 
representatives and stakeholders did not heed to these lessons.  
 
Economic Analysis:  
A deeper dive into the broader economics behind the decision to fund Allegiant Stadium 
yields the same results; Las Vegas’ revenue sources show that the investment is not sound. 
Aguero argued that they expect 35 percent of fans for events in the stadium to come from outside 
Las Vegas, and each out-of-town fan to stay an average of 3.2 nights and spend $820 per trip 
(Belson, 2020). Therefore, using Aguero’s numbers of projected outside fans coming to 
Allegiant, Las Vegas would accrue $18.65 million yearly off of the Raiders. Concerts and other 
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events will generate additional revenue, so this number is likely slightly higher than the initial 
estimation.  
Regardless of how much these stadiums make, a few caveats exist that diminish out-of-
town guests’ revenues. This calculation assumes gross profit, not net, and stadiums are extremely 
expensive to maintain. In 2014, the home of the Seattle Seahawks, CenturyLink Field, cost 
$16.44 million to maintain (Washington State Public Stadium Authority, 2014). For the 
Minnesota Vikings’ new stadium, the city of Minneapolis will pay $7.5 million annually, with 
these costs set to increase each year in order to maintain a first-class stadium (Kaszuba, 2012). 
Cities are often on the hook for part or most of renovation costs, with constant threats of 
relocation if they do not undergo renovations or upgrades as deemed essential by the owners. 
Another issue with Aguero’s estimate is the potential overestimation of out-of-town fans in the 
first place. It may seem that Aguero was correct in estimating how many non-Las Vegas 
individuals will attend the games – approximately 40% of tickets acquired have been from 
outside of Nevada (Ticketing Business News, 2020). However, many of these tickets were 
acquired by California residents, many of whom will make the drive to the games and will not 
spend 3 nights in Las Vegas. Other savvy buyers, understanding the value of tickets to a new 
stadium, could purchase tickets and resell them above face value to Las Vegas residents close to 
game day, rendering the out-of-town benefits as moot. The numbers Aguero provides are eye-
popping, but concealed costs and potential overestimation of out-of-town visitors are likely to 
diminish any benefits Las Vegas hoped to reap.  
Another argument made by proponents is that the Las Vegas Raiders would become an 
important part of the Las Vegas economy, supplementing traditional Las Vegas industries such 
as tourism and gambling. These arguments are certainly a stretch, considering the sheer size of 
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these two industries in the city. Before the pandemic hit, 49.5 million tourists visited Las Vegas, 
spending $34.5 billion directly for a total economic impact of $57.6 billion (LVCVA, 2019). In 
the 2019 fiscal year, 169 large casinos in Las Vegas reported total revenues of nearly $22 billion. 
Their aggregate net income almost reached $2 billion (PaySpace, 2020). Even the most generous 
estimates, which predict that Las Vegas would make tens of millions per year in revenue off the 
stadium, would barely move the needle on the overall economy. Considering the $750 million 
taxpayer cost of the stadium and estimates to make roughly $20 million annually, it would take 
37.5 years for the investment to break even. Meanwhile, teams usually threaten to relocate unless 
they receive a new stadium roughly every 25 years (Ortiz & Glier, 2016). By the time that the 
stadium would become even slightly profitable, the average stadium stint suggests that the 
Raiders would have either left or demanded a new stadium. This calculation does not even 
consider maintenance costs or the economic displacement stadiums have on surrounding 
businesses.   
Allegiant Stadium may not benefit Las Vegas, but there is no doubt that the Raiders 
organization will profit substantially. Directly after the stadium was built, the Raiders’ valuation 
surpassed $3 billion, ranking twelfth among the 32 teams in the league. Only five years ago, 
when playing in the dilapidated Oakland Coliseum, the Raiders were worth $1.4 billion, 31st out 
of the 32 teams (Ozanian & Badenhousen, 2020). Additionally, with the NFL soaring in 
popularity in recent years, lucrative television deals from major networks have become 
commonplace. CBS, NBC and Fox shelled out a total of $39.6 billion between the 2014 and 
2022 seasons, and these fees are set to rise by about 7% annually in 2022, meaning they will 
each be paying the NFL more than $2 billion per year (Draper, 2021). ESPN will pay about $2.7 
billion a year on average, up from their previous payment of $2 billion. With a media market 
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clamoring for a football team, the international brand of the Raiders and a brand-new stadium 
ready for broadcast, the Raiders realized that relocating to Las Vegas would afford them these 
highly profitable deals.  
Television deals are clearly the golden goose of the entire operation, but ticket sales are a 
steady source of cash that helps owners and the front office remain profitable. The new Allegiant 
Stadium has a capacity of 65,000 fans and the stadium will host 8 games per year. The pandemic 
has severely reduced supply and increased demand, so while ticket prices right now are more 
expensive than normal, ticket costs are projected to average $153.47 when life returns to normal. 
With these factors in place, the Raiders would accrue $79.8 million in gross ticket sales. Clearly, 
the Raiders would not collect all of this, as much of this revenue is distributed: typically, 55% of 
that revenue is used to pay athletes, 10% goes to general stadium administration, 5% goes to the 
team’s coaching staff, 5% is paid in taxes, and the remaining 8% is profit (Sportico, 2019). 
Assuming the 8% margin, the total profit from ticket sales is roughly $6.4 million annually.  
Hoping to sell tickets in a manner that would pay off their construction costs, the Raiders 
utilized the controversial practice of personal seat licenses (PSL) in search for even more 
revenue. PSLs allow teams to grant fans the right to buy season tickets for a certain seat in a 
stadium across several seasons. The Raiders raised a whopping $549.2 million in PSL revenues; 
the Raiders used this money as the direct contribution to the construction of the $1.97 billion 
stadium project (Snel, 2020). Fans paid anywhere from $500 to $75,000 to secure exclusive 
rights to their seats, and fans still have to spend more on the price of the ticket for the eight home 
games at each NFL stadium with these licenses (Belson, 2020). Under ideal circumstances, the 
PSL holder can sell individual games above face value or resell the license for more than they 
originally paid. In practice, the values of PSLs fluctuate often based on factors such as team 
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record, fan engagement and stadium quality, and can even lose their value entirely if a team 
relocates, such as St. Louis in 2016 (Barrabi, 2020). Fans, generally, do not understand the 
inherent risk in these investments; many have taken out loans and spent thousands on down 
payments just to secure the rights to the seats, not the seats themselves.   
 
Discussion:  
The aforementioned evidence shows that the affluent partners of the Las Vegas Raiders 
are the beneficiary of the new Allegiant Stadium, rather than taxpayers or the greater economy. 
This raises the question of why Las Vegas politicians would sponsor such a measure, knowing 
that these deals do not stand to benefit their constituents. Here is where the theory of client 
politics can shed light on the logic of stadium construction. Knowing that Las Vegans were in 
search of a new football team, these politicians worked together with a powerful “client,” in this 
case the Raiders, to improve their political prospects. Las Vegas politicians funded the stadium 
and lured the Raiders, making it two teams they had successfully recruited in two years – Las 
Vegas also won an NHL expansion team in 2017. Economic considerations aside, recruiting two 
teams in such a short span sends a message that Las Vegas is a growing city capable of hosting 
sports teams; studies have shown that citizens place value on having sports teams in their city, 
even if they do not follow the team themselves (Owen, 2006). Politicians reap the positive 
political gain, as Las Vegans praise those who were the driving force behind their new teams. 
Meanwhile, since many Americans are unaware of the economic toll, politicians are able to 
masquerade the economic disadvantages of their actions.   
There was little incentive for policymakers to subject a stadium-subsidy plan to a 
referendum or initiative because it could open the possibility that voters would reject the 
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proposal (Kellison & Mills, 2020). By closing off avenues for the citizenry to disrupt the 
construction process, politicians gain the benefits of sports teams in their city while minimizing 
their costs. Politicians are able to satisfy the organized interest group, in this case the Raiders, 
while also benefiting from constituents who are unaware they are being harmed. Client politics is 
a nontransparent system, and Las Vegas politicians demonstrated how this secrecy plays out.  
Client politics is likely not the only factor that led to the approval of Allegiant Stadium: 
Las Vegas lawmakers may have seen the gaudy economic projections and voted to support. 
Applied Analysis testified that the stadium would bring $620 million in annual economic activity 
and thousands of jobs, an estimate that compares to the enormously profitable casino industry 
(Southern Nevada Tourism Infrastructure Committee, 2016). Representatives such as Senator 
Farley heard testimony from these stakeholders, believed the numerical figures and subsequently 
voted in favor of the stadium. In an interview with a local Nevada newspaper, Nevada Attorney 
General Aaron Ford, a state senator in 2016, said that he could not “leave [the] chamber and look 
a laborer in the eye and say I had a chance to give you a job, but I didn’t” (Gentry, 2020). Farley 
added that he was persuaded by his constituents, many of whom were in the construction sector 
and had struggled to find work since the Great Recession. Farley and Ford were disappointed in 
the job and economic results, mainly because they believed the exaggerated projections and were 
not aware that stadium construction often results in negative outcomes.  
Since Allegiant Stadium is so new and has not even welcomed fans inside due to 
COVID-19 protocols, a complete economic analysis is hard to conduct. Yet, if the early reports 
are any indication, Allegiant Stadium will prove to be an unwise investment for the city of Las 
Vegas, as the nearly $2 billion price tag has not created as many benefits as once promised. The 
intrinsic public benefit of Allegiant Stadium must be considered, as there are new intangible 
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benefits catalyzed by the stadium: a state-of-the-art facility with new businesses and restaurants 
is an attractive proposition to most. However, as many previous studies measuring the intangible 
benefits of sports stadiums have concluded, these amenities will certainly not justify the $750 
million price tag. Las Vegas citizens should be excited that they have a new football team in their 
area, as well as a beautiful new stadium that will host many exciting events in the future. Yet, if 
these citizens were aware of the economic overestimations and the political machinations 
required to build their stadium, they would realize that their new stadium is not all that it is made 































Case Study #2: Dropping the Ball – The Bronx Bombers and New York Politicians 
 
The New York metropolitan area is densely populated with stadiums and areas as well as 
people. Within a 60-mile radius of Madison Square Garden in the heart of Manhattan, there are 
four stadiums and four arenas, totaling roughly 335,000 seats in total for baseball, hockey, 
basketball, football and soccer teams. Sitting in the Bronx, Yankee Stadium is perhaps the most 
famous, known for its pristine white arches and stylistic logo perched atop the entrance from the 
161st Street subway exit. Known as the “Cathedral of Baseball,” the original Yankee Stadium 
was the long-time home of the Yankees, with the team playing there from 1923 to 1973 and then 
from 1976 to 2008. The Yankees have a celebrated past with more World Series championships 
than any other franchise and legends by the name of Babe Ruth and Joe DiMaggio. What is less 
celebrated is the lengthy and controversial process of building the new stadium, as well as its toll 
it took on New York infrastructure and constituents alike.  
Now a coveted franchise known by most baseball fans, the Yankees were once a 
relatively obscure team. In 1922, Yankees owner Jacob Ruppert funded the entire Yankee 
Stadium, spending $2.4 million, or only $345 million in 2021 dollars (Sullivan, 2008). With a 
new stadium at their disposal, the Yankees, with Babe Ruth at the helm, rose to become 
baseball’s most respected and successful franchise, winning a World Series every two years, on 
average. But when CBS purchased the team in 1964 for $13.2 million, the success ground to a 
halt, and the “Bronx Bombers” finished no higher than 3rd for a decade. Taking a backseat to the 
successful New York Mets in Queens, CBS decided to offload its underperforming asset to a 
group of investors. The tides changed dramatically in New York when in 1973, George 
Steinbrenner and a consortium of investors purchased the franchise for $10 million. The Yankees 
returned to their old success, winning several more championships and even earning a new 
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stadium in the process. As it stands, the Yankees are now worth $5 billion, or the second most 
expensive team behind the Dallas Cowboys. Adjusted for inflation, Steinbrenner and his partners 
increased the Yankees’ valuation 96x higher than the original investment (Gough, 2020).   
The Yankees did not need public subsidies to fund their stadium, as the affluent owners 
of the team, in conjunction with substantial revenues from a variety of sources, would have 
easily covered the cost of the stadium. Not only do the Yankees earn the highest valuation, but 
they are also the richest team in baseball, with annual revenues over $300 million and giant 
television deals with local and national partners. The Yankees also accrue additional revenue 
from their own cable TV network, $117 million in gate receipts, and $30 million in licensed 
merchandise, granting them the largest payroll, as well (Harrington, 2011). The Yankees had 
fallen to fifth in total ticket revenues during the 1996 season, but the club’s total revenues were 
$129 million – $26 million more than the next-closest franchise and more than twice the average 
of other MLB teams (Stern, 1998). Yet, during the late 1990s and early 2000s, Steinbrenner 
threatened to relocate the team, arguing that the run-down neighborhood in the southwest Bronx 
made it impossible to attract enough fans to keep the Yankees competitive. 
Due to perpetual threats that he would move the Yankees, Steinbrenner leveraged his 
asset and reached a lucrative deal to stay in New York. Steinbrenner negotiated a $2.3 billion 
new stadium with $1.2 billion in public subsidies, far surpassing the record for overall public 
funding towards a stadium. Even when discounting the $417 million in property-tax breaks, it is 
still one of the largest stadium subsidies ever, and the Yankees are only on the hook for $670 
million. The main question of this case study is understanding why New York politicians obliged 
the Yankees. To do so, I first analyze the political maneuverings associated with Yankee 
Stadium construction, and then move into an economic analysis of the stadium and various 
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loopholes utilized by stadium proponents. As with the Raiders case study and the myriad other 
examples of stadium construction, the purported economic benefits and political leverage offered 
by this deal were key in the approval and construction of Yankee Stadium.  
 
Stadium Construction Process: 
Satisfying constituents certainly was not the motive for building the stadium, as previous 
referendums on stadium construction had failed in the New York metropolitan area. In 1984, 
New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean authorized the use of land for a new baseball stadium in the 
Meadowlands, but the state legislature voted against the measure (Peterson, 1995). In 1987, New 
Jersey voters rejected a proposal that would allocate $185 million of public financing to the 
construction of a new Yankee Stadium (Sandomir, 2008).  Despite public opinion suggesting that 
New Jersey citizens would not welcome the Yankees, Steinbrenner continued to use relocation as 
a threat towards New York City lawmakers. In 1988, Mayor Ed Koch agreed to have city 
taxpayers fund $80 million for lucrative luxury boxes at Yankee Stadium; Steinbrenner initially 
agreed, but then rescinded on the offer, realizing he could extract more from politicians desperate 
to hold on to their team. This pattern would reoccur, and by 1995, Steinbrenner had rejected 13 
proposals to keep the Yankees in the Bronx (Sandomir, 1995).  
While it may seem as if Steinbrenner held all the political leverage in these negotiations, 
a deeper look at the context of the issue reveals that his bargaining power was quite limited. 
Steinbrenner’s biggest constraint was the possibility that he would have to finance the entire 
stadium in New Jersey. Governor Christie Whitman had said repeatedly that she would not spend 
tax dollars on a ballpark and would not accommodate a new team unless the financial data 
showed a solid investment (Pooley, 1995). He would also have to absorb a fierce public relations 
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hit, as the optics of moving the storied New York franchise would have angered New York 
residents. Yet, New York politicians, terrified of the political implications of losing one of the 
most storied franchises in sports, focused more heavily on reaching a deal than calling 
Steinbrenner’s bluff.   
New York’s most powerful figures often reneged on campaign promises or their political 
philosophies in order eliminate any risk of the Yankees leaving town. Mayor Rudy Giuliani, 
despite promises to lower taxes and reduce government intrusion into the economy, announced 
tentative billion-dollar deals with the Yankees and Mets towards the end of his term in 2001 
(Harrington, 2011). This political gambit by Giuliani was savvy, as he attached his name to the 
legacy of the fields while also placing the onus of blame on his successor, Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg, if negotiations were to sour. Bloomberg referred to Giuliani’s proposal as “corporate 
welfare,” but his viewpoint shifted after realizing the gravity the Yankees had on his 
performance as mayor. Despite budget gaps estimated at $3 billion in 2008, Bloomberg 
encouraged state and local officials to help fund Yankee Stadium’s price tag (Damiani & 
Steinberg, 2008). Because the Yankees carry so much cultural capital, any mayor who were to 
lose the team would anger the Yankee faithful, which could reflect in the next election. Giuliani 
and Bloomberg understood that public financing may be an unpopular decision among New 
Yorkers, but losing the team could lead to their political downfall.  
New York’s government agencies also participated in sly undertakings by gaming the tax 
system and perpetually underestimating construction costs. In testimony presented to the 
Independent Budget Office, the New York City Council Finance Committee explained that over 
a 30-year period, subsidies and exemptions would cost the city $170 million (IBO, 2006). This 
testimony vastly underestimated the total cost of public financing, as the final number ended up 
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closer to $1.2 billion. By fronting the construction costs, it appeared as if the Yankees would pay 
for most of the stadium; however, they were not required to pay rent, mortgage recording taxes, 
or sales tax, and these subsidies cost the taxpayers. In an audit of the Yankees Stadium, the Chief 
Counsel of the IRS revealed that the Yankees had taken advantage of a loophole that allowed 
sports stadiums the benefit of tax-exempt financing. Using this method, the Yankees saved 
$189.9 million in construction costs, according to New York City’s Independent Budget Office 
(IBO, 2006). In 2008, the House Committee on Government Oversight and Reform questioned 
the practices of the new Yankees Stadium in a hearing titled “Gaming the Tax Code.” The 
hearing revealed how federal taxpayers were deprived of $950 million due to the non-taxable 
nature of the bonds, as well as the monopolistic structure of the Yankees and the MLB as a 
whole. The president of the Yankees, Randy Levine, admitted in his written testimony that the 
Yankees would have left the Bronx if they did not receive payment-in-lieu-of-taxes financing, 
further contributing to the evidence that the Yankees took advantage of their bargaining leverage.   
Mayors and prominent agencies were highly involved in permitting Yankee Stadium’s 
construction, but local representatives also featured in the equation. In a process that took nine 
days and involved no public opinion or referendum, New York city policymakers agreed to build 
over Macomb’s Dam Park and a section of John Mullaly Park – popular destinations in the 
Bronx – and then have New York taxpayers pay $130 million to replace them. There were 
several groups of residents that organized to prevent relocation, including Save Our Parks, Bronx 
Voices for Equal Inclusion and Save Yankee Stadium (Damiani & Steinberg, 2006). Yet, 
Council Member Maria del Carmen Arroyo said that her constituency did not reach out to her 
regarding the proposal. Arroyo was correct in that her constituency was not very vocal about the 
issue, but the lack of pushback was not due to widespread public approval but rather a nine-day 
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window to vocalize complaints (Mindlin, 2005). The actions of New York representatives like 
Arroyo draw parallels to those of Bloomberg and Giuliani – no matter the public resistance to the 
stadium, keeping the Yankees in the Bronx was far too important to their political careers to 
consider otherwise.  
 
Economic Analysis:  
With all of the political background aside, understanding the economics behind this 
decision gives an objective look at whether the stadium was worth the price. Below, I outline 
why the stadium is largely not worth its price despite several economic reports indicating 
otherwise. The only party that benefitted financially from the new stadium were the Yankees 
themselves. The new stadium followed a similar trend as many other new stadiums, in that the 
inhabiting team increased their valuation dramatically after construction ended. From 1998 to 
2011, the Yankees valuation increased from roughly $400 million to $1.35 billion, a sizable 
237% increase in total and 18.23% yearly. As soon as Yankee Stadium was finished, the 
valuation rose from 1.35 billion to its current $5 billion valuation, a 270% increase and 30% 
yearly (Forbes, 2020).  
The Yankees benefitted handsomely from the construction project, but these benefits did 
not trickle down to the taxpayers. The City of New York and two public benefit corporations, the 
Empire State Development Corporation (ESDC) and the Economic Development Corporation 
(EDC) released a General Project Plan (GPP) that outlined the financial considerations of the 
stadium. Some highlights from the GPP included $70 million for new parking garages, a 
property tax exemption of $44 million and tax breaks on mortgage recording taxes and sales 
taxes (NY Parks & Recreation, 2006). The Yankees fronted the construction costs for the 
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stadium itself, but the rest of the bill would be paid by taxpayers as the Yankees were exempt 
from these payments. The Yankees also exercised various clauses in New York City’s 
infrastructure program, including the Empire Zone program, which encourages business 
development in designated areas, as well as the Industrial and Commercial Incentive Program, 
which provides a property tax break to commercial buildings that are physically improved, 
expanded or newly constructed (Damiani & Steinberg, 2006). The Yankees ostensibly fronted 
the cost for the construction, but the sheer number of provisions and tax breaks in place allowed 
them to shell out a negligible net payment in the end.  
Tax breaks for the Yankees not only covered their costs but deprived a substantial source 
of revenue from the city when they did not collect the payments. Because subsidies for sports 
stadiums typically involve direct public expenditures for the construction of the facility, revenue 
sources such as rent and taxes spurred by the stadium would ideally be recovered by the city. 
However, the financing arrangement for the Yankee Stadium project involved a contribution of 
over $200 million from the city and state for up-front costs including parking garages and 
replacement parks (Damiani & Steinberg, 2006). Revenue sources designed to benefit the city 
were unable to be recuperated, and the burden fell on the New York taxpayer to fund these 
payments.  
Perhaps these taxpayer costs would be justified by the economic revenue created by a 
new stadium, but this is not the case. The Yankees generated $683 million in total revenue in 
2019 – an impressive number – but much of this number is diluted by player salaries, stadium 
upkeep and administration costs. Additionally, because the Yankees maneuvered their way out of 
tax and rent payments, this revenue is not reinvested back into the city and instead goes back to 
the team itself. Therefore, when New York City or the Yankees project total generated revenue 
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to impress their constituents, their estimates tend to be far greater than the actual result. For 
instance, an analysis by the New York City Economic Development Corporation estimated that 
the 2018 home opener would generate $6.6 million in revenue, due to 25,000+ visitors travelling 
to New York City and creating economic activity for local businesses (NYCEDC, 2018). 
Nevertheless, this estimate projects $5.2 million in indirect economic impact, which factors in 
the spending of Yankee Stadium employees and companies who benefit from the spike in visitor 
expenditure. As previous literature covers, outside visitors may spur some level of growth, but 
the economic displacement of spending at stadiums versus other businesses in the area create a 
zero-sum outcome. The net revenue may be close to $6.6 million, but these predications fail to 
take into account the influence of Yankee Stadium and its ability to take away from surrounding 
industries.  
Politicians and the Yankees front office promised job growth, but the estimations from 
both parties were far different than the results. Supporters of the stadium believed that Yankee 
Stadium would create 1,000 permanent jobs, based on Levine’s estimate. This estimate differs 
from city and state-sponsored research, which put the figure at 700 and 598 jobs, respectively. In 
reality, the official job creation was closer to 15-30 full-time jobs, as most of the jobs were 
seasonal or temporary (IBO, 2006 & Dwyer, 2009). Creating these jobs is one part of the 
equation but ensuring that jobs actually provide long-term opportunities for New Yorkers is 
another challenge. The head of several development corporations on the project said that there 
was no means to ensure the Yankees create their target number of jobs; as the results show, the 
Yankees overpromised and undelivered (Dwyer, 2009).   
Arguments for neighborhood revitalization make little sense, considering that the new 
Yankees Stadium is directly across the street from its former home. Despite New York officials 
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arguing otherwise, the new stadium does not draw more economic activity than its predecessor, 
as many attendees of the Yankees are either New York residents or tourists that would attend the 
game anyways. The IBO reasoned that providing a new or substantially refurbished stadium to 
the Yankees would generate an additional $111 million in economic activity and $5 million in 
city revenues (IBO, 2006). Much of this revenue would derive from increased ticket prices at the 
Stadium; however, ticket prices have actually decreased from $51.83 in 2010 to $47.62 in 2019 
(Gough, 2020). Although a new shopping mall, the Gateway Center, has opened at the nearby 
Bronx Terminal Market and has provided many new minimum-wage jobs, the profits go to major 
corporations rather than the people of the Bronx (Harrington, 2011). The Gateway Center has 
also hurt small businesses in the area, as many Bronx businesses have reported that their profits 
have shrunk as much as 50% since the new Yankee Stadium opened (Harrington, 2011).   
Not only are there negligible benefits created by Yankee Stadium, but many proposed 
features included in official reports are either nonexistent or less than promised. One report 
included that there would be a passive park, named Ruppert Plaza, that would comprise of an 
allee of trees on 1.13 acres of new parkland. The design of Ruppert Plaza would include 
significant landscaping, including shaded areas and passive park amenities, such as benches, 
resting areas, and pedestrian walkways (NY Parks & Rec, 2006). In reality, Ruppert Plaza is a 
parking garage, with no park features and no additional park land added in comparison to the 
older stadium. Several other proposals, including 14 tennis courts above a parking garage on 
161st street, streetscape improvements and replacement facilities, are simply non-existent. The 
project’s Draft Environmental Impact Statement argues that the 3,000 new parking spaces would 
not result in additional vehicle trips and would ease traffic in the neighborhood. This claim goes 
against well-established parking data, as the availability of parking is a key determinant in how 
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fans get to the venue (Damiani & Steinberg, 2006). Changes or restructuring is commonplace 
during a major construction project like Yankee Stadium, but many of these improvements that 
were attractive to taxpayers, fans and citizens alike were not similar to the proposal.  
 
Discussion:  
  Now that the stadium has been in place for over a decade, the Yankees faithful has 
returned mixed reviews. One prominent criticism from the earlier years was the poor layout of 
the stadium itself, as the seating area in center field obstructs the views from bleacher seats on 
both sides and seats near home plate are inaccessible for fans to interact with players (Kepner, 
2009). In the 2016-2017 season, the Yankees decided to renovate the bleacher area, adding 
additional costs to the original construction project. Other construction problems include large 
cracks in the stadium’s concrete ramps, and the company involved drew criticism from mob 
connections and a propensity to forge test results (Rashbaum & Belson, 2009). Another criticism 
has been the lack of fan noise, a complaint that has been shared by fans and players alike. Many 
Yankees players, including legends Mariano Rivera and Derek Jeter, said that the new stadium 
lost the aura of the previous storied stadium. In his autobiography, Rivera wrote that the stadium 
“doesn’t hold noise, or home-team fervor, anywhere near the way the old place did. The old 
Stadium was our 10th man—a loud and frenzied cauldron of pinstriped passion, with a lot of 
lifers in the stands.” (Rivera & Coffey, 2014). The stadium is certainly beautiful, but these 
criticisms, in conjunction with the high public cost and a loss of public parkland, challenge the 
utility of the new stadium.  
 Whether to achieve political gain or avoid poor political outcomes, client politics can 
help us understand how this state of affairs came to be. The Yankees front office carried a 
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tremendous amount of leverage and took advantage, as the departure of their team would be 
catastrophic for New York politicians. The Yankees forced New York politicians to contribute a 
massive amount of funding to the overall total; however, harming the diffuse and unknowing 
taxpayer was preferable to losing the beloved Yankees. And while there were citizen groups that 
organized to prevent the stadium’s construction, politicians purposefully sped up the process to 
shut out the citizenry from having any say. The actions of politicians to appease the organized 
minority, in this case the Yankees, while spreading out the losses across millions of New 
Yorkers, is a classic case of client politics.    
Quantifying the public good benefit of the new stadium is difficult, as Yankees fans are 
notoriously passionate for their team and may evaluate their team differently than previous CVM 
or hedonic models. Yet, the tactics utilized by politicians and Yankees front office to build the 
stadium raise questions to how beneficial the stadium truly is. This case study highlights the 
high-stakes decision-making of political leaders and economic interests, and its public cost 
serves as an example for many of the high-priced stadiums introduced in recent decades. Yet, at 
its foundation, Yankee Stadium is one of the many instances of how the concentrated gainers of 
stadium construction triumph over the dispersed, poorly organized taxpayers. The powerful 
Yankees, with help from prominent politicians, used their bargaining power over taxpayers that 
were too spread apart to effectively create a coalition or any form of resistance. The result: a 
brand-new Yankee Stadium, one that favors public officials’ political prospects and the Yankees 








Lessons Learned: Zooming Out Domestically and Internationally 
 
When analyzing other stadium construction projects and their backgrounds, the Raiders 
and Yankees are not extreme examples, but rather representative of this public policy issue. The 
two cases yield valuable lessons that are generalizable to other settings. Firstly, powerful 
interests are able to yield a disproportionate amount of power in this domain, and by doing so 
they harm a significant portion of taxpayers in the region. Politicians oblige these processes, both 
to mitigate risk but also to benefit politically. Secondly, politicians and owners alike 
systematically overestimate the benefits of new stadiums to sell the stadium as a solid investment 
and to limit potential pushback. Lastly, while intangible benefits are present in stadium 
construction, they do not justify the expenditures for new stadiums. These lessons help set the 
stage for the following discussion, which zooms out from the Yankees and Raiders to apply these 
findings to other contexts.  
The underestimation of public costs seen in New York is a widespread problem in sports 
construction. The Atlanta Falcons – an NFL team – are similar to the Yankees in that they vastly 
underestimated the price tag for their stadium. The initial estimate for Mercedes Benz Stadium, 
their new stadium, was $1 billion in total, with total public funding coming in at $200 million. 
These figures were below the final total by hundreds of millions of dollars. After problems with 
the construction itself and the need for more capital, politicians ended up shelling out over $1 
billion in public funding, $248 million of which was issued through local bonds (McDonald, 
2016). Combined with $77 million in sales tax rebates, infrastructure investments and usage of 
city-provided land, as well as annual payments for renovations and the eventual demolition of 
the stadium, Atlantans will be responsible for over five times the initial $200 million estimate. If 
all taxpayers were aware of these costs, there would likely be much more resistance to these 
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deals. Interested parties minimize pushback from the public by utilizing lesser-known payment 
methods, such as tax-exempt municipal bonds, or by omitting future costs of renovation. The 
income that lenders earn on municipal bonds is exempt from federal income taxes, meaning that 
the taxpayer needs to make up the difference not covered by taxation; unfortunately, the average 
American is not aware of these complexities. Construction costs are easy to understand, but 
municipal bond structures are not, so taxpayers contribute funds without understanding where 
their money goes. The other strategy is to obscure renovation payments as a part of the public’s 
tax contribution. As the Raiders case study indicated, renovation costs tally in the tens of 
millions per year, much of which falls on the taxpayer. These costs are incurred in the future and 
are not part of the original expense report for a stadium, so the public is often not aware that they 
will have to pay even more than they had thought initially.  
The Yankees and Raiders case studies highlighted how politicians overestimate job 
growth, and this pattern is not exclusive to these two stadiums. In St. Louis, statistical evidence 
suggested that the levels of employment in the construction industry were neither higher nor 
lower during the construction of two new stadiums (Miller, 2016). To replace Candlestick Park, 
the proponents for a publicly funded stadium created the slogan “Build the stadium – create the 
jobs!” (Noll & Zimbalist, 2011). These proponents argued that, similar to the Yankees and the 
Raiders, that new infrastructure and stores near the stadium would create new job growth in areas 
desperately needing help. The final result was similar to St, Louis’, in that the stadium only 
created 60 full-time jobs (Avalos, 2014). Instead of focusing on permanent job growth, 
politicians use part-time and temporary job estimates and then promulgate this information. For 
instance, the replacement for Candlestick Park, Levi’s Stadium, technically created 12,000 new 
jobs with the rest dissolving as construction ended. Yankee Stadium and Allegiant Stadium both 
 51 
created thousands as well, but the final estimates are reduced to near-zero after construction jobs 
end. Many of these jobs are also transferred jobs, as workers will move from their positions as 
security guards or concession workers at old stadiums and occupy the same position at the new 
stadium. Instead of focusing on total job output, politicians cleverly count all the jobs required to 
build the stadium, leading to perceived job growth that does not really exist.  
 Another justification of stadium construction not specific to the Raiders and Yankees is 
that a new facility will catalyze economic development in the area. While there is evidence that 
sports facilities offer opportunities to spur economic growth at the local level, such as the reuse 
of underutilized buildings, economic development is not guaranteed (Chapin, 2007). Baltimore is 
considered as a success story in this area, in that they utilized old warehouses and dilapidated 
infrastructure and developed a stadium now considered to be one of the most beautiful in all of 
sports. And yet, despite the Orioles drawing in fans from all over the country, the City of 
Baltimore receives a net of less than $40,000 every year after its $1 million annual payment 
towards stadium debt (Dougherty, 2014). Other cities such as Cleveland, Boston, Denver, 
Indianapolis and Phoenix have also pledged economic redevelopment, but studies have shown 
that these promises have not lived up to expectations (Austrian & Rosentraub, 2016). 
Constituents may be enthusiastic with the significant amounts of revenue produced by sports 
teams, but economic development should not be confused with economic distribution. There is 
an opportunity cost associated with a new stadium, because if the stadium did not exist, 
constituents would spend their money in other areas.   
The downfalls of stadium construction may appear uniquely American, but the dynamics 
that played out in New York and Las Vegas appear to be universal. International governments 
fall into two categories when trying to build a stadium and host an event. The first is similar to 
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American construction projects, in which governments believe that a large-scale event, such as 
the Olympics or the World Cup, will benefit the economy or improve their political prospects 
(Zimbalist, 2020). The second reason is to enhance the social status of the country itself, hoping 
that the internationally broadcasted event will bring fame and relevance (Alegi, 2008). In many 
cases, the result is similar to American outcomes, in that the purported benefits fall far short of 
expectations. In some countries, the outcomes range from directly harmful to outright 
catastrophic.   
Stadiums built to elevate a country’s social status may achieve this goal, but many side 
effects of these investments have been detrimental. The prodigious Cape Town Stadium in South 
Africa cost $600 million to construct, and yet the stadium is rarely used since the 2010 World 
Cup and has even seen calls for its demolition (Alegi, 2008). During the process, 70,000 
construction workers went on strike in 2009 after being paid negligible wages for their work, and 
human remains were found on site (Stadium Database, 2020). For the 2014 World Cup in Brazil, 
eight workers died in a fire during construction, several structures collapsed, crew destroyed 
rainforest and thousands of families in Rio de Janeiro’s slums were cleared out to accommodate 
stadium land (Powell, 2016). The $220 million dollar stadium is now a white elephant, situated 
in a city where one-quarter of its inhabitants are extremely poor and lack running water.  
The most catastrophic example of stadium construction is seen in the upcoming 2022 
World Cup in Qatar. Eager to show off Qatari progress, the nation is building an entire city for 
the occasion, with a cost estimated at $45 billion. Not to mention the staggering cost, migrants 
from Bangladesh, India and Nepal working on various stadiums’ refurbishment are exploited or 
even subjected to forced labor, unable to change jobs, leave the country or receive timely 
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compensation (Amnesty International, 2020). Over 6,500 of these workers have passed away, or 
an average of 12 migrant workers per week since Qatar won their bid in 2010.  
These international examples reinforce the perils of stadium construction, ranging from 
the burden of the taxpayer to severe human rights violations. The rewards for these projects are 
so high that interests are willing to neglect the huge costs that accrue in the background. If large 
groups coordinated to avoid these outcomes, whether through protests or through coordinated 
voter efforts, then these outcomes would potentially become sparser. However, there have been 
sparse examples of citizen groups or other activism impeding these processes, so as long as this 
enterprise remains profitable and incentive-laden, the phenomenon is likely to stick around for 
quite some time.  
This thesis focuses mainly on the economics and politics of stadium construction, but 
there are several avenues for further research. One major topic that necessitates further research 
is the environmental impact of sports stadiums. Stadium construction utilizes huge amounts of 
resources, much of which could be redirected towards environmental efforts, affordable housing 
or other projects that would more directly benefit these cities. Stadiums also create traffic jams in 
many areas, and the negative externalities of air pollution and congestion are direct consequences 
of stadium construction. Another topic that has barely any coverage in the literature is the health 
and safety of construction workers when building sports stadiums. In 2020, two workers died in 
a six-week span at the new SoFi Stadium in Los Angeles (Fenno, 2020). Many other workers 
have suffered life-altering injuries over the course of these construction projects, with most due 
to blatant code violations and construction mishaps. During the COVID-19 pandemic, an 
estimated 25 construction workers at SoFi stadium were infected with the virus (Duarte, 2020). 
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Whether these problematic outcomes are consistent with normal construction projects or 
exacerbated by the high-demand timeline of sports stadiums is worth consideration.  
The Yankees and the Raiders case studies offer nuanced examinations of stadium 
construction, but this discussion highlights how these themes apply both domestically and 
internationally. American politicians and team owners often exaggerate benefits to their 
constituents, with the final outcome delivering less than promised. International examples not 
only build on these themes but have even reflected the severe human rights violations associated 
with stadium construction. And yet, the intangible benefits in each instance never measure up to 
the associated costs. Simply put, stadium construction is an issue in which the outcomes always 
















As the Raiders, Yankees and various other cases have shown, stadium construction is a 
product of an imbalanced power struggle. The concentrated gainers of stadium construction, 
which includes stakeholders such as team owners and politicians, far outweigh the dispersed and 
relatively insignificant citizen groups. Gainers have strong incentive to invest in consultants or 
lobbyists to push forward their agenda, as doing so can reap great economic rewards in the 
future. Citizen groups against public subsidization have attempted to end public funding for these 
projects, but they the lack the political clout and well-organized nature of the gainers. Having a 
requisite number of citizens signing off on a petition may lead to a referendum on the issue, but 
powerful interest groups outspend public action groups significantly to defeat these ballot 
measures (Coates & Humphreys, 2003). By the time it is clear that a subsidy was a bad idea – 
assuming that constituents even notice – the officials who approved the deal have long left 
office.  
Despite these powerful and organized gainers, there has been moderate success in 
curbing teams from securing public dollars. Miami politicians, worried that they would lose their 
basketball team after threats to leave the city, capitulated and promised $165 million of taxpayer 
dollars to replace their eight-year-old stadium (Bernstein, 1998). Only after a large-scale public 
protest were politicians dissuaded from shelling over millions, and they rescinded their offer. In 
recent years, citizen groups in cities like Austin and Seattle have collectively organized and 
garnered enough signatures to introduce the issue in city-wide elections. In Austin, over 26,000 
voters – the required number to introduce a piece of legislation to the city council – signed a 
petition to prevent public funding for the new Austin FC stadium. Seattle citizens created a group 
called “Citizens Against Sports Stadium Subsidies,” in which they filed a petition to have a 
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referendum overturning the Metropolitan King County Council’s decision to send $135 million 
in public funds toward the Mariners ballpark. There have also been referenda in Cleveland, 
Pittsburgh, Columbus, San Antonio, St. Paul, Scottsdale and more. Collective action problems 
are omnipresent in obtaining signatures and rolling out plans to prevent public funding, but 
Miami, Seattle, Austin and the other cities show that it is not out of the realm of possibility.  
Citizens have avenues for change in this area, but organizing against the powerful 
coalition of politicians and business interests has proved nearly impossible. Using the very same 
examples as above, one can see that citizen activism has not actually led to better outcomes. The 
Miami Heat paid for private construction of their stadium, but the upkeep is on the public. The 
stadium sits on $38 million of county land and is in operation due to $64 million in public 
subsidies (Garcia-Roberts, 2010). Austin’s Proposition A, which asked voters if they want the 
right to vote before the city sells or leases any city-owned property for a non-public sports or 
entertainment venue, failed by an overwhelming 62.9% to 37.1% (Neely, 2019). In Seattle, the 
original backers withdrew the petition from consideration only a week after introducing the idea, 
and members of the group offered no reason for their decision. King County Councilmembers 
posited that these citizen groups did not have enough resources to obtain signatures or hire a firm 
to carry out the process for them. Cleveland, Pittsburgh and the other remaining cities all had 
protracted affairs that eventually fizzled.  
Due to the large revenue streams generated by new or renovated sports facilities, teams 
have considerable incentive to sway public opinion toward their side in these votes. Local 
politicians also stand to gain from the granting of these subsidies, in terms of political capital and 
visible accomplishments in the community (Coates & Humphreys, 2003). Citizen groups cannot 
rival the amount of influence of these two groups and have subsequently struggled to halt public 
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funding for these projects. However, there have been some glimmers of hope for stadium 
detractors in recent years. In 2016, San Diego voters rejected Measure C, a proposal that would 
have increased the city’s hotel occupancy tax by an additional 6 percent to fund the construction 
of a city-owned stadium (Ballotpedia, 2016). After this ballot measure failed, the San Diego 
Chargers, unable to receive public funding, relocated to Los Angeles. Those against public 
funding for stadium construction achieved a rare win, despite stadium proponents and the 
Chargers outspending their opponents by millions of dollars (Garrick, 2016). It is possible that 
San Diego is the exception to the norm of stadium construction, but San Diego voters’ ability to 
fight back against powerful interest groups shows that change in this area is possible.  
There are many avenues for further research in the field of stadium construction that do 
not involve the already large literature of cost-benefit analyses. A compelling study would 
analyze why public action groups have largely failed to halt public funding and suggest potential 
solutions to this problem. The present study is the first to view stadium construction through a 
client politics lens, so additional studies expanding the scope of client politics to stadium 
construction would build upon my study. Additionally, more specific studies on fans’ valuation 
of sports teams on a city-to-city basis would be extremely helpful for the literature. Fans in 
Boston or Chicago may value their teams more highly than Phoenix or Orlando, and 
subsequently assign a higher willingness to pay to keep their team. If a study uncovered these 
trends, then one could determine the fair price for what constituents are willing to pay and aim to 
reform public subsidization to match these figures.  
My thesis aims to further illustrate the pervasive problem of stadium construction, and 
the various machinations used to place the burden on the taxpayer. These results reinforce the 
idea that not only is stadium construction a bad deal for the taxpayer, but that the process is 
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harmful in other, non-financial areas. My research also highlights the nuances of this issue and 
the various actions of interested parties to achieve what they want, and how these often-subtle 
actions have negative consequences. As long as the monopolistic structure of these leagues 
persist, fans maintain their interest for their teams and the valuation of teams increase, these 
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